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Abstract
In 2008, approximately 12 million immigrants lived illegally in the United States, and large
numbers of undocumented foreigners resided also in other advanced destination countries.
Hence, attempts at controlling immigration ﬂows seem to often fail. If governments are
not enforcing their “oﬃcial” immigration policy, why do they set such a policy in the ﬁrst
place? The purpose of this paper is to address this apparent puzzle, using a political agency
framework. We consider a setting in which there is uncertainty on the supply of migrants, and
the policy maker – who faces elections – can be of one of two types. Either he has preferences
congruent with the median voter, or he desires a larger number of migrants, because he is
interested in the maximization of social welfare or has fallen prey to a pro–immigration lobby.
We show that, if the incumbent wants to admit more migrants than the median voter, he
might ﬁnd it optimal to announce a binding quota to be re-elected, and strategically relax
its enforcement. The control of migration ﬂows can take place at the border or domestically,
and we argue that even if the former is less eﬀective as a policy tool, it might be chosen in
equilibrium. Thus, our model illustrates how strategic considerations by elected oﬃcials play
an important role in explaining both the observed large number of illegal immigrants and
lax enforcement.
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1“The single most critical issue to protect our nation is the securing of our borders and our
ports. (...) At the same time, our government turns a blind eye to the thousands of people who
illegally cross our borders. These scenarios exists because corporate America has convinced our
leaders that this is one of the best ways to remain competitive”1
1 Introduction
Recent estimates for the United States suggest that in January 2008, 12 million individuals were in
the country as undocumented aliens, representing approximately four percent of the total number
of residents. The sheer size of the problem has made illegal immigration a prominent issue in
the political debate,2 and it might suggest that the US government is not able to eﬀectively
implement its “oﬃcial” migration policy. Other major immigrant destinations also host large
numbers of undocumented foreigners. Recent estimates for a group of them, reported in Table 1
(taken from Fasani 2009), show that also in Italy and Greece (besides the US) well over twenty
percent of the total number of foreigners is represented by illegals, and these ﬁgures are likely to
be a lower bound to the true size of the phenomenon.3
At the same time, Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) – among others – have shown that the
extent of migration policy enforcement is negatively correlated with the recent patterns of economic
activity in sectors which intensively use illegal immigrants - like agriculture, construction, personal
services etc. This evidence suggests that the number of illegal immigrants might be the result of
an intentional government policy, which responds to the needs of particular economic interests,
rather than of its inability to control the actual ﬂow of foreign workers.
This begs an important question. If governments are not willing to stick to their oﬃcial
policies, why do they set such policies in the ﬁrst place? The purpose of this paper is to address
this apparent puzzle by developing a political economy model in which we show that an elected
oﬃcial might ﬁnd it optimal to set a binding migration policy, even if he knows that he will not
enforce it. In fact, we will show that because of electoral concerns, a government might strategically
set an oﬃcial migration target to please a majority of voters, while relaxing its enforcement to
pursue a diﬀerent objective, such as, for example, maximizing social welfare or pleasing lobbies
from sectors who gain from the availability of foreign workers.
In the recent US migration history, lax policy enforcement has been the result of both under-
funding and the ineﬀective use of the resources allocated to enforcement activities. Starting
from the late seventies, when the illegal immigration problem has become predominant in the
1Source: http://loudobbs.tv.cnn.com/category/broken-borders.
2See “Obama wins unlikely allies on immigration” The New York Times, July 18 2010.
3Dolado (2007) suggests that in the case of Spain during the nineties, about 98% of the legal foreign residents
in the country had been illegally living in the country at some point.
2Country Stock Share of foreign pop. Year Inﬂow Year
United States 12000 32.4 2008 500 2008
European Union (15) 650 2001
Austria 100 10.8 2003 50 2001
Italy 650 22.1 2008 100 2001
Germany 500 7.4 2005 90 2001
Greece 250 43.8 2007 80 2001
Spain 570 10.9 2008 40 2001
United Kingdom 725 11.1 2007 95 2001
Table 1: Estimates of stock and ﬂows of illegal immigrants in thousands (Fasani, 2009)
policy debate, several observers have argued that the former has been a major constraint. For
instance, the ﬁnal report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy instituted
by the Carter administration strongly supported “... increased funding for the immigration and
naturalization service” (Briggs 1982). Even more recently – despite the substantial increase in the
budget of the INS,4 which has taken place between 1980 and 2004 – the proposal for migration
reform put forward by Senators Reid et al. (2010) continues to highlight the need for more
investment in migration policy enforcement.
Another important feature of US policy is the disproportionate concentration of resources on
border enforcement. As Hanson (2006) points out, between 1980 and 2004 real expenditure in
this area has increased over six times, and in 2005 it reached 2.2 billion US dollars. As a result,
in 2003, the US authorities devoted more than ﬁfty times more man-hours to “line-watch” (i.e.
border) enforcement than to worksite enforcement, a strategy that “...appears ill-suited to curtail
unauthorized entry in a country that shares a 2000-mile long land border with a poor neighboor”
(Hanson 2006). In other words, the increase in overall funding for policy enforcement seems to
have been accompanied by an ineﬀective use of these resources. More generally, several observers
have suggested that the Department of Homeland Security might employ its resources ineﬀectively
for strategic motives (Cornelius et al. 2004).
While intentional lax enforcement may provide an appealing explanation for the observed large
numbers of illegal immigrants, the strategic use of ineﬃcient policies is hard to reconcile with the
fact that governments should be punished by voters if they behave “badly” behavior. At the
same time, to correctly punish politicians, voters must be able to monitor the implementation of
migration policy, including its most complex or technical aspects. Since governments typically
have better information than the public on the policy making process, elections may sometimes
fail to hold them accountable. Hence, to understand why migration enforcement may be slack even
4The INS is now part of the Department of Homeland Security.
3if politicians are subject to the scrutiny of voters, we develop a model which is able to explain the
adoption of underinvestment or ineﬀective enforcement as the result of asymmetric information
between the policy maker and the electorate. In our setting, we consider two possible sources of
ineﬃciency. First, the public might not be informed on the budgetary aspects of migration policy,
and this may allow the politician to exploit his information advantage to strategically underinvest.
Second, voters may not be aware of the characteristics of the enforcement technologies available to
the policymaker, and thus they can fall victim of a strategic misallocation of the resources towards
a less eﬀective policy instrument.
In our analysis, we consider a two–period setting in which a small country initially faces uncer-
tainty on the potential number of migrants, which can be either high or low, and the probability
of the two events is common knowledge. The domestic economy produces one output good, using
capital and labor as inputs. Each domestic agent is endowed with one unit of labor, whereas
capital ownership is heterogeneous across them. Immigrants are endowed instead only with la-
bor and as a result, domestic residents have heterogeneous preferences towards immigration. In
particular, individuals with a higher share of capital prefer a larger number of foreign workers
to be admitted, as this will raise the return to capital. Since typical wealth distributions imply
that the median voter owns a share of the capital stock in the economy which is below average,
he prefers a number of migrants lower than the social surplus maximizing one. Starting from an
autarky equilibrium, migration is initially desirable, but due to congestion eﬀects, there exists a
ﬁnite number of immigrants, which maximizes individual welfare. The actual inﬂow can be limited
by carrying out enforcement activities, the cost of which depends on the diﬀerence between the
supply of foreign workers and the target chosen by the government. Hence, in our model, the
migration policy consists of two elements: a migration target and an enforcement cost.
The actual number of foreign workers entering the country is determined by the politician in
power, which can be of one of two types, randomly drawn from the same distribution, which is
common knowledge. The ﬁrst has preferences perfectly aligned with those of the median voter, and
we will refer to him as a populist. The second has instead preferences congruent with the average
citizen, i.e. he maximizes social surplus, and prefers a larger number of immigrants compared
to the populist. We call him benevolent. The type of the politician is unknown to the citizenry.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period the incumbent chooses the migration policy. At its end,
the citizens, having observed only the oﬃcial migration target and the actual number of foreign
workers which have entered the country, use Bayesian updating to revise their beliefs on the type
of the incumbent, and decide whether to re–elect him or not. In the second period, the elected
politician - with full knowledge of the supply of foreign workers - chooses again the number of
immigrants to be admitted and the world ends.
In this set-up, we analyze how re-election concerns might aﬀect migration policy in general,
4and the number of illegal immigrants in particular. In the second period, given that there are no
further elections and the government is informed about the supply of foreign workers, politicians
choose the migration policy that maximizes their individual welfare, and no illegal immigration
arises. The policy choice in the ﬁrst period is instead more complex, due to the information set-up
and the re-election incentives.
Because of the uncertainty on the supply of migrants, the ﬁrst period migration policy will
necessarily be sub-optimal. In particular, if the supply of migrants is high, then the number of
foreign workers entering the country will be larger than the target chosen by the government,
whereas if it is low, then the government will have over-invested in enforcement. In either case, as
long as the migration policy chosen maximizes the expected social surplus, the resulting migration
level will be “constrained–eﬃcient” and the (positive) diﬀerence between the number of migrants
that have entered the country and the migration target represents constrained–eﬃcient illegal
immigration.
Elections further complicate matters because, during the ﬁrst term, the incumbent politician
may face an important trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, he wants to implement his most preferred
policy, on the other he wants to be re-elected. We can show that, while this dilemma does not
arise for a politician whose preferences are aligned with those of the median voter, for an oﬃcial
preferring more migrants, choosing his most preferred policy is costly, as it entails an electoral
defeat. As a consequence, he tries to exploit his information advantage over the voters to be
re-elected, while choosing a policy that is as close as possible to his most preferred one. To achieve
this objective he tries to “pool” with his political opponent by setting the same target as the
populist, but choose a diﬀerent enforcement strategy to allow more migrants in the country in
a concealed way. For this purpose, he can either underinvest in enforcement compared to what
the median voter wishes, or he can allocate the median voter’s desired budget to an ineﬀective
enforcement technology. In deciding whether to under-invest or spend more on a less eﬀective
technology, the politicians weights the cost and beneﬁts of the two strategies. Underinvesting
is better when the state of the world is low, because it generates the same number of migrants
while using less resources to carry out enforcement activities. On the other hand, using a larger
budget on a less eﬀective technology might be preferable when the state of the world is high
because, by spending more on enforcement, the number of migrants admitted may turn out to
be closer to the benevolent politician’s ideal number. If this potential policy gain is larger than
the higher enforcement cost, then an equilibrium with “high but ineﬀective spending” can arise,
whereas strategic under-investment will be chosen otherwise. In both cases, during the ﬁrst period
of oﬃce, the benevolent politician adopts a policy which is diﬀerent from his most preferred one,
thus incurring in a utility loss. However, by doing so, he can be re-elected to a second term and
choose his most preferred policy under full information, thus achieving his ﬁrst best. Hence, the
5ﬁrst period sacriﬁce might be worth taking, provided that it helps the benevolent politician to be
re-elected.
We show that, for the benevolent politician to have a chance of re-election, ﬁrst of all it is
essential that the median voter revises upward his belief that the incumbent is a populist. This is
possible only if the supply of migrants is more likely to be high, because only in this case “pooling”
is a costly action for the benevolent politician. In fact, if ex-post the potential supply of migrants
is large, then the number of illegal immigrants allowed by the “sub-optimal enforcement” is larger
than the highest possible level that a populist would choose. Hence, the median voter ﬁnds out
that the politician is not populist and votes him out. On the other hand, if the number of illegal
immigrants is low, the benevolent politician succeeds in convincing the median voter that he is
a populist, and that the observed illegal immigration is only due to the imperfect enforcement
associated with the uncertainty on the actual migrant supply. As long as the expected gain
arising from winning elections is larger than the expected loss from the potential electoral defeat,
the benevolent politician decides to choose a suboptimal enforcement. Therefore, our analysis
shows that, in the presence of informational asymmetries, electoral considerations may in fact
induce politicians to choose an ineﬃcient policy, allowing more migrants to enter illegally than it
would be socially desirable. They do so to avoid the electoral punishment brought about by the
implementation of a less restrictive target, which would allow a higher number of immigrants to
legally enter the country. Thus, our model is able to rationalize both the large number of illegal
immigrants observed in many destinations, as well as the systematic adoption of ineﬀective tools –
like border enforcement – or the shortage of resources allocated to the control of migration ﬂows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature,
whereas section 3 presents the economic environment. Section 4 introduces the political game
and section 5 characterizes the policy choice. Section 6 analyzes the choice between border and
domestic enforcement and section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A substantial literature has developed to study the desirability – from the point of view of the
destination country – of immigration in general and, more speciﬁcally, of illegal immigration. For
a small country, Berry and Soligo (1969) have shown that free migration is the welfare maximizing
policy. At the same time, in a world with heterogenous agents, even policies that maximize
aggregate welfare might lead to the creation of winners and losers, as has been argued for instance
by Borjas (1995). The working of political economy forces, unleashed by the distributional eﬀects
of immigration, has resulted in the widespread use of restrictions to the free mobility of labor
(Facchini and Mayda 2010) and several papers have developed models which explain the formation
6of policies towards overall migration (Benhabib 1996, Facchini and Willmann 2005 and Epstein and
Nitzan 2006). Naturally, if immigration policies are binding, large numbers of potential migrants
are not allowed to legally enter the desired destination. Some will be discouraged and decide not
to emigrate, but other will try to enter illegally.
Several papers have considered the policies that should be implemented by a welfare maximiz-
ing government to limit the inﬂow of undocumented foreigners. In his pioneering contribution,
Ethier (1986) develops a small country model to analyze the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent instruments
towards this end, focusing on the use of domestic and border enforcement. Bond and Chen (1987)
have extended his analysis to a two country setting, allowing also for the possibility of capital
mobility. Woodland and Yoshida (2006) have relaxed the assumption that the potential migrants
are risk–neutral, to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent attitudes towards risk. Chau (2001) develops
instead a model in which the use of immigration amnesties might be optimal in an environment
in which border and domestic enforcement suﬀer from a credibility problem, i.e. they are time
inconsistent. These papers provide rich frameworks in which both the decision to migrate and the
eﬀects of diﬀerent policies in the destination countries are considered. On the other hand, they
do not explicitly analyze the role of political economy forces in shaping the demand side of illegal
immigration, a factor that – as shown by Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) and Fasani (2009) – can
play an important role.
Several papers have developed political economy models of illegal immigration from the point
of view of the host country. In an early contribution, Diajic (1987) looks at the level of enforcement
which will be chosen by a government as the result of lobbying expenditure in a reduced form model
a la Findlay and Wellisz (1982). Similarly, Chau (2003) uses a model with lobbying to study the
political process through which border and domestic enforcement are chosen in equilibrium, and
under which conditions an amnesty might be introduced. Importantly, in both these frameworks,
legal immigration is absent from the model and as a result, the only source of additional labor
supply for the destination country’s employers is represented by undocumented foreign workers.
Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) and Fasani (2009) develop a similar, simple reduced form lobbying
model. Hillmann and Weiss (1999) focus instead on the sectoral dimension of immigration policy.
In particular, they show that, even if the median voter in the destination country would prefer no
migration at all, if illegal immigration has taken place, and domestic enforcement makes illegal
immigrants a “sector speciﬁc” input, ex post illegal immigrants will be tolerated and further
inﬂows will be allowed.
In our paper, we also study the political economy forces driving the presence of illegal immigra-
tion, but diﬀerently from the existing literature, in our model the phenomenon arises endogenously
as the result of the migration policy chosen by the government (i.e the combination of an oﬃcial
quota and its enforcement). In our set-up, illegal immigration crucially depends on the migration
7policy because, ﬁrst, the phenomenon arises whenever the number of foreign workers entering
the country is higher than the oﬃcial quota; and second, the number of illegals depends on the
migration quota itself and on the policy implementation eﬀorts undertaken by the government.
In particular, illegal immigration is the result of imperfect enforcement, which can be due both
to the government’s pure lack of information or to its strategic behavior. On the one hand, since
the potential supply of foreign workers is uncertain, even a government with preferences aligned
with those of the median voter might not be able to limit the inﬂow of foreign workers to its
desired level. On the other, “excessive” illegal immigration can arise as an equilibrium outcome
if a politician maximizing social welfare sets a quota to please the median voter, but at the same
time strategically relaxes enforcement to obtain his goal.
To show how voter’s imperfect information may lead to an ineﬃcient policy, our analysis
is carried out within a political agency framework, where the role of re-election incentives can
be explicitly analyzed.5 In political agency models, the voter (principal) uses elections to both
provide incentives and select the best type of politician (agent). However, when information is
imperfect, moral hazard and adverse selection arise. In other words, the voter might not be able to
discipline the politician and retain what is, from his perspective, the best “type” of elected oﬃcial.
A prominent example of the type of ineﬃciency that can arise in a political agency framework
is illustrated by Coate and Morris (1995). In this paper the authors show that a government
concerned about re–election might prefer a “sneaky”, ineﬃcient redistributive policy beneﬁtting
a lobby over an eﬃcient “open” redistribution scheme which might lead it to lose in the ballot.
The spirit of our analysis comes close to Coate and Morris (1995), since also in our model the
government might prefer to allow immigrants in the country in a concealed, ineﬃcient fashion,
rather than promoting a more open, eﬃcient migration policy. Importantly, our setting diﬀers
from theirs, because we consider a framework in which we have both an explicit “policy target”
and a costly enforcement activity (Stigler 1970), and the latter is the potential object of strategic
manipulations. Thus, our paper is also related to the literature on enforcement of laws and
regulations. Research in this tradition (Stigler 1970 and Polinsky and Shavell 2007 among others)
focuses on the optimal amount of resources and mechanisms of enforcement, with a particular
attention to the working of those agencies responsible for detecting and sanctioning violators, and
their potential to misbehave (Mukherjee and Png 1995, Banerjee 1997 and Pagano and Immordino
2010). Alongside this economics literature, which analyzes the behavior of bureaucrats, several
scholars in political science have stressed the inﬂuence of elected oﬃcials on regulatory policy. In
particular, according to the so–called “congressional dominance” approach (Weingast and Moran
1983), representatives have several tools at their disposal to control subordinate agencies, one of
the most important being the “power of the purse”, i.e. the allocation of the budget (Calvert,
5For an overview of political agency models, see Besley (2006).
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Moran, and Weingast 1989). In our analysis we also embrace the view that elected politicians are
“powerful”, in the sense that they control both the setting of the policy target and its enforcement,
and we provide a micro–foundation for the strategic behavior of oﬃcials facing rational voters in
an asymmetric information setup. Thus, while our focus is on the design and enforcement of
migration policy, our analysis has implications for a broad variety of economic environments in
which elected oﬃcials set both standards and the corresponding enforcement level.
3 Economic Environment
Home is an economy which produces one good according to a production function Y = F K,E , ( )
where K is the stock of capital assumed to be exogenously given, and E is total employment.6 The
economy is populated by a continuum of native individuals indexed by i 0,1 , and the population ∈ [ ]
size is normalized to unity (i.e. 1). Every individual i supplies the same exogenously given N =
amount of labor, and is endowed with a fraction λi of the overall capital stock K, with λidi = 1.7 ∫
Furthermore, let the domestic wage under autarky be larger than the wage prevailing in the rest of
the world. Thus, abstracting from relocation costs, foreign workers will ﬁnd it desirable to migrate
into the domestic economy.
Admitting immigrants I leads to welfare gains for Home, which are bounded by the presence
of a “congestion” cost c I , which is a diﬀerentiable, increasing and convex function. In the ﬁrst ( )
part of the paper, we focus for simplicity on the situation in which the Home country government
has at its disposal a single enforcement technology, and introduce a second instrument in section 6.
To constrain the inﬂow of immigrants, a cost is sustained which depends on the diﬀerence between
the supply of foreign workers I and the target I chosen by the government. Let the enforcement
cost be η I I , where η . is an increasing linear function of the chosen migration target I (i.e.
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∂η . . ( ) 0). Hence, the smaller is the number of migrants I allowed to enter (i.e. the more ∂I ∂I =
restrictive the migration policy), the larger is the enforcement cost. Moreover, for any chosen
target, a larger supply of migrants has a positive eﬀect on both the total and marginal cost of






( ) > 0) implying that the supply of foreign workers I can aﬀect the
I I∂I
�
optimal migration policy. We begin by considering the case where there is only one enforcement
technology and illustrate the basic mechanism through which ineﬃcient enforcement may arise in
this set-up. In section 6 we extend our discussion to analyze the more complex scenario where the
6We are assuming that F E > 0, F E < 0 and F E 0. ( ) ( ) ( ) = ′ ′′ ′′′
7We are assuming that the distribution of factor ownership is atomless i.e., that every agent only owns a tiny
fraction of the total supply of capital. Notice that if we denote with Ki the supply of capital by agent i, Kidi = K. I ∫
Ki. Since population size is normalized to 1, K is also the average supply of capital in the population. Deﬁne λi = K




politician can choose between two enforcement technologies, one of which is more eﬀective than
the other.
The supply I of foreign migrants is stochastic, and depends on the state of the world s, which
can be either low (L) or high (H). In particular, let I ˆ L I and I ˆ H I, where I > I. The ( ) = ( ) =
probability that the state of the world is H (L) equals q (1 q). Hence, the utility of a native −
individual i can be written as follows
ui E λiπ E w E c I η I s I (1) ( ) = ( )+ ( )− ( )− (�( )− )
It is easy to show that
Lemma 1 As long as the utility function is concave, the number of immigrants I∗ maximizing i
individual i’s utility is an increasing function of λi and of the the supply of foreign workers I.
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for the maximization of equation 1 is
ui
′(I) = −λiLF ′′(I)+F ′′(I)−c′ +η′ = 0 (2)
which implicitly deﬁnes a function g I∗ λi ,λp u I = 0. Applying the implicit function ′ ( ( ) ) ≡ i( )




dλi (3) dg dλi
= −
dI
dg Given that the utility function in equation 1 is concave,
dg < 0. Notice that dλi Lf′′ > 0, which dI = −
implies the result. Moreover, since η is increasing in I, if the supply of foreign workers increases, ′ �
for the ﬁrst order condition to be satisﬁed, the optimal number of migrants must increase.
The previous lemma implies that individuals with a higher share of capital prefer a larger
number of foreign workers to be admitted, as this will raise the return to capital. In particular,
since their preferences are single peaked in I, domestic residents can be ranked according to
their most preferred number of migrants. Hence, there exists a continuum of citizens distributed
according to their migration preferences, and we denote by i = p the median of this distribution,
and by λp his share of the overall capital stock. Typical wealth distributions imply that λp < 1,
i.e. that the median voter owns a share of the capital stock in the economy which is below the
average (Alesina and Rodrik 1994 and Dutt and Mitra 2002).
By aggregating individual preferences, we can write down the social surplus as follows:
S I π E w E c I η I s I (4) ( ) = ( )+ ( )− ( )− (�( )− )
where π E is the return to immobile capital and w E is the wage and E = N +I. ( ) ( )
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Note that, since the only diﬀerence between the utility of an individual i and the social surplus
is given by the share of capital (λ = 1), then lemma 1 also holds if we consider aggregate welfare,
which coincides with the utility of the citizen endowed with the average share of capital. As
a consequence, because the median voter owns a share of capital below the average (λp < 1),
the number migrants maximizing social surplus is necessarily larger than that preferred by the
median voter. Furthermore, the number of migrants maximizing domestic welfare is an increasing
function of the supply of foreign workers. As a result, since the supply of foreign workers I, in
the ﬁrst period, is not observed, then the number of migrants which maximizes the social surplus
is given by the weighted average of the quantities maximizing social surplus under the two states
of the world, i.e. I∗(H and I∗ L , where the weights are given by the probabilities 1 − q and q ) ( )
respectively.8 In other words,
I∗ 1 (5) = ( −q)I∗(L)+qI∗(H)
and the corresponding policy enforcement cost is
(6) E(η) = (1−q)η[I −I∗(L)]+qη[I −I∗(H)]
Notice that ex–post, given the realized supply of foreign workers, this enforcement level will
turn out to be sub–optimal in the sense that the actual number of migrants, denoted by I s , is
diﬀerent from I∗ s . To understand this point, consider ﬁgure 1, where we have represented the ( )
( )
enforcement costs necessary to implement any given level of immigration under the two possible
states of the world. If the state of the world is high, to obtain the desired immigration level I∗ H ,
the government should spend η I I∗ H . Hence, having spent only [ − ( )]
( )
E η (7) ( ) ≡ (1−q)η[I −I∗(L)]+qη[I −I∗(H)] < η[I −I∗(H)]
the actual number of migrants I H entering the country illustrated in ﬁgure 1, will be higher
than the level I∗ set by the government. The diﬀerence I H I∗ represents the number of illegal
( )
( )−
immigrants. On the other hand, if the state of the world turns out to be low, the government will
have overinvested in enforcement, and the number of immigrants actually entering the country
(I L in ﬁgure 1) is lower than the government’s target. ( )
8This follows immediately from the fact that
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Figure 1: Illegal immigration
4 The game
Individuals in this economy live for two periods t 1,2 . Initially, a randomly drawn politician ∈ { }
g is appointed to choose in period t = 1 the migration policy (which constitutes the politician’s
strategy) prescribing a target Ig and enforcement η . for that period. We assume that there are ( )
only two types of politicians, which are independently drawn from an identical distribution. One
type (the “populist”, i.e. g = p) has preferences perfectly aligned with those of the median voter,
while the other (the “benevolent”, i.e. g = b) maximizes social surplus, thus prefering a higher level
of immigration. The probabilities that the politician is a populist or a benevolent are denoted by
µ and 1 µ respectively. −
At the time of the policy choice, neither the politician nor the public observe I s , but they
know its distribution. At the end of the ﬁrst mandate, having observed the target Ig and the
actual number of migrants I s , but neither their supply nor the amount of resources spent on ( )
enforcement, voters revise their beliefs on the type of the incumbent according to Bayes rule, and
decide whether to reelect him or to replace him with a challenger. The elected politician observes
I s , chooses again the number of immigrants to be admitted in t = 2, and the world ends.9
9Notice that in the second period, knowing the actual supply of immigrants, the politician will choose his ﬁrst
best policy. This assumption is needed to create an incentive for the oﬃcial to be reelected and it is more natural,
in our framework, than a standard ego–rent from oﬃce.
12We denote by P p Ig,I s the ex-post probability that the incumbent (g) is a populist [g = � ( )]
( ) (p) when the observed number of migrants is I s and the target is Ig. In carrying out our
analysis, we focus on monotonic beliefs which have the following property:10 whenever the median
voter observes a number of migrants coinciding with his most preferred one, he does not revise
downward the probability that the incumbent has his same preferences, and viceversa. In other
words, a “good outcome” cannot result in more pessimistic beliefs and a “bad outcome” cannot
result in more optimistic ones.
The above structure deﬁnes a game of incomplete information between voters and politicians
that can be solved by backward induction. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game consists
of a migration policy, a voting rule and set of beliefs such that a voters’ beliefs are generated
by Bayesian updating, b the voting rule is optimal given the voters’ beliefs and the politicians’





In the second period, because there are no further elections, the incumbent chooses the policy
maximizing his own utility. Moreover, because he can observe the supply of foreign workers, he
chooses the optimal amount of enforcement (i.e. there is no illegal immigration).
In the ﬁrst period, the policy choice is more complex because of re-election concerns, and it
crucially depends on voters’ beliefs. Since beliefs are monotonic, a populist incumbent will always
choose the policy preferred by the median voter. In fact, by doing otherwise, he cannot improve
his reputation of being a populist, and hence increase his chances of re-election. The same is
not true for a benevolent type: by choosing in the ﬁrst period his most preferred policy – i.e.
by playing sincere – he can only decrease his ex-post probability of being considered a populist,
whereas by “pooling” with a populist, he may raise it. We focus on three strategies, denoted by
σ, that allow a benevolent incumbent to “pool” with a populist in some state of the world, and
s ( )
chooses strategy σ and the state of the world is s.
σ
g we denote by I the number of migrants actually entering the country when the politician g
11 The ﬁrst strategy, that we name mimicking
m), requires the benevolent politician to choose the same policy - i.e. an immigration target (σ =
1 q ( − )
under any state of the world. The second is an under-investment strategy (σ =





p + qI I and the corresponding level of enforcement - adopted by a populist =
u), that allows the
10As in Coate and Morris (1995), we focus on monotonic beliefs implying that a “good” politician (in our case the
populist) will not have incentive to distort the policy. An alternative assumption leading to the same equilibrium
outcome would be that the populist does not behave strategically. This avenue is followed for instance by Besley
and Smart (2007), who assume that one of the two types of politicians is not strategic.
11Notice that our assumption of monotonic belief implies that any other strategy, which would not allow pooling
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Figure 2: The underinvestment strategy
benevolent politician to “pool” with the populist only if the state of the world is low. To do so,
∗ the benevolent oﬃcial sets the same target Ip as the populist, but strategically under-invests in
enforcement choosing an amount ηu such that, if the state of the world is low, the resulting level
of migration is the same one generated by a populist-type under the high state of the world, i.e.
H ( )
entering the country will be higher than both that obtained by maximizing social surplus and the
( ) u
b I However, if the actual supply of immigrants is high, the number of foreign workers = . p
H H ( ) > Ib( )
strategy the benevolent incumbent tries to exploit his informational advantage on his own type,
H ( ) > I u
b upper-bound obtained by the populist, i.e. I . With this type of “pooling” p
together with the uncertainty on the state of the world, in order to admit a higher number of
migrants and at the same time be re-elected. If the state of the world is low, the incumbent may
have a chance to achieve his objective, because he generates the same number of migrants that a
populist would admit under the high state of the world. On the other hand, if the state of the
world is high, the median voter will uncover the true type of the incumbent, and therefore will
not re-elect him. The working of the underinvestment strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.
A similar logic applies to the third strategy we consider, where the benevolent politician over-
invests (σ = o) to “pool” with the populist only if the state of the world is high. If the state of the
world is instead low, the number of migrants entering will be lower than both the lower-bound
obtained by the populist, and that obtained by social surplus maximization, i.e. I
Ib L . ( )
14
o
b L ( ) < Ip( ) < LWe are now ready to describe the voters beliefs’ updating process. Given that, based on the
available information on the state of the world, a populist politician always chooses the migration
level preferred by the median voter, whenever the median voter observes a level of migration
diﬀerent from either Ip H or Ip L , he concludes that the incumbent is benevolent. On the other ( ) ( )
hand, denoting by γL the probability that a benevolent incumbent admits a total number I of
migrants when the state of the world is low, and by γH the probability that he generates the same
number if the state is high, then if voters observe the target I∗ and the outcome Ip H , the ex-post p ( )
probability that the incumbent is a populist can be computed as follows:
µq
P p Ip
∗,Ip H [g = � ( )] =
µq +q 1 µ γH + 1 q 1 µ γL ( − ) ( − )( − )
where µq is the probability that Ip H is generated by a populist, q 1 µ γH is the probability that









that it is generated by a benevolent type under-investing in enforcement. In the remainder of our
analysis, to save on notation, we will drop the target Ip
∗ from the deﬁnition of the conditional
probabilities, as the target is the same under all three types of strategy we consider.
If mimicking is the strategy chosen, then γH = 1 and γL = 0, which implies that P p Ip H [g = � ( )] =
µ, i.e. the ex-post probability of the incumbent being populist is equal to the ex-ante probability.
On the other hand, if under-investment is chosen , i.e. γH = 0 and γL = 1, then:
µq
P p Ip H [g = � ( )] =
µq +(1−q)(1−µ)
1 Note that µq+
µq > µ if and only if q > 2. In other words, under-investment can generate (1−q)(1−µ)
an upward revision of the ex-ante probability that the incumbent is a populist only if “pooling”
is suﬃciently costly for the benevolent incumbent ( i.e. q is suﬃciently large). This is because the
larger is q, the higher is the probability that by under-investing he will end up revealing his type.
We can similarly compute the voters’ beliefs when Ip L is observed. In this case: ( )
µ 1 q
q 1 µ 1 µ qγH








where again, if γH 0 and γL = 1, we have that P p Ip L µ, whereas γH = 1 and γL = 0 =
� ( )] = (1−q)+q(1−µ)
[g = � ( )] =
imply that P[ p Ip L µ
µ(1−q) . Hence, with over-investment, the ex-post probability g =
that the incumbent is a populist exceeds the ex-ante one if and only if q < 1 2. /
Given this structure of beliefs, the sequentially rational voting rule for the median voter is to
retain the incumbent if and only if, having observed the actual number of migrants, he believes




12 probability, i.e. P p I s > µ. [g = � ( )]
Given the voting strategy described above, mimicking cannot be optimal for a benevolent
incumbent because in this case (i.e. γL = 1) the ex-ante and ex-post probabilities of being a
populist are the same, P p Ip H µ. This implies that the incumbent will not be re-elected, [g = � ( )] =
because the median voter always prefers to replace him with a challenger. For the same reason, if
q 1 2, over-investment cannot be optimal, and the same is true for under-investment if q 1 2. ≥ / ≤ /
This allows us to immediately establish the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose that q = 1 2. Then a benevolent incumbent plays sincere and admits in the /
ﬁrst period his preferred number of migrants.
On the other hand, if q > 1
2, a benevolent incumbent may ﬁnd it optimal to under-invest rather
than play sincere and lose elections. If the incumbent decides to under-invest, the number of
migrants entering the country will be Ip H if the state of the world it low, and Ib
u H if it is ( ) ( )
high. Moreover, if the supply of migrants turns out to be low, the incumbent will be re-elected,
which implies that in the second period he will choose his most preferred number of migrants
∗
b ( )
probability µ and by a benevolent challenger with probability 1
. On the other hand, if the state of the world is high, he will be replaced by a populist with
−µ. Suppose that the incumbent
under ( )
incumbent’s payoﬀ can be written as:






b Iu under 1 q u Ip H +qu H 1 q u b ( ) = ( − ) [ ( )] [ ( )]+( − ) [
On the other hand, choosing his most preferred policy in the ﬁrst period, a benevolent incum-
L µu ( )]+q{ [ H 1 µ u ( )]+( − ) [ (H)]} U I I I
bent will for sure be replaced by the challenger in the second period. Denoting by U sincere the ( )
payoﬀ obtained by playing sincere, the payoﬀ of the incumbent becomes:
sincere 1 q ( ) = ( −
[
)




L +qu Ib ( )]










b H 1 q u ( )]+( − ) [
> µ, then for the median voter it is clearly not optimal to replace the incumbent with a challenger
that has a lower probability of being populist. Similarly, if P < µ, for the median voter it is optimal to
replace the incumbent with a challenger that has a higher probability of being populist. Finally, when P
{ ) 1 µ qu ( − ){ [ (L)]} 1 I I I qu
12If P p I [g = � ]
I
we can show that dismissing the incumbent is optimal. First, when P[
[ p g =
p I [g = � ]
µ, dismissing the incumbent is a
credible punishment because the median voter is indiﬀerent between keeping him and replacing him with somebody
µ =
I p g = =
with the same probability of being median. Now, we can show that the punishment in fact optimal. If a benevolent
incumbent plays mimicking - and thus P p I µ - this voting strategy implies that the voter will not re-elect [g = � ] =
him. As a consequence, the incumbent will be better oﬀ by just choosing his most preferred policy in the ﬁrst period
and lose elections, rather than choosing the policy preferred by the median and loose elections anyway. Therefore,
between mimicking the populist and revealing its type, the politician prefers to reveal its type. Thus, adopting
this voting rule, the median voter induces the revelation of the politician’s type. As a consequence, he re-elects the
populist type and dismisses the benevolent type, thereby achieving the highest possible payoﬀ for himself.
16Hence, under-investment will be preferred when U under sincere . Some additional ( ) > U( )
H ( ) = notation will be useful to characterize the under-investment equilibrium. Let Δ1 U under
u Iu H u Ib H < 0 be the ﬁrst period utility loss from under-investment when the state of [ b ( )] − [ ( )]
the world is high - i.e. the diﬀerence between the utility from under-investment and the utility
that the benevolent incumbent would obtain choosing his most preferred policy. Similarly, let
Δ1U under Ip H u Ib L < 0 be the ﬁrst period utility loss when the state is low. L ( )
(
= u[ ( )] − [ ( )]
Finally, Δ2U under) = u[I∗(L)]−u[Ip
∗(L)] > 0 denotes the second period utility gain from being b
in power, when the state of the world is low as compared to being replaced by a populist challenger.
Under-investment is preferred to the social surplus maximizing policy if the following holds:
HU under 1 q µΔ2U +Δ1 qΔ1
LU under ( ) < ( − )[ ( )]
The left hand side of the inequality is the expected utility loss from under-investment: if the
state of the world is high (which happens with probability q), by under-investing, the benevolent
incumbent will generate a migration level which is higher than his most preferred one and incur
in the loss Δ1 U under . The right hand side represents the “net” expected gain from under- H ( )
investment: if the state of the world is low (which happens with probability 1 q), the benevolent −
incumbent will obtain his most preferred level of migration in the second period, but to do so
he will have to sacriﬁce his most preferred migration choice in the ﬁrst period incurring in the
loss Δ1U under . Note also that, since by underinvesting he gains Δ2U with probability 1 q ,








then the expected gain is given by µ 1 q Δ2U.
1 We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium of our game when q > : 2
under ( )
under
2 1 + Δ U Δ µ L
1 ΔHU( qu ̃ = −
U Lemma 3 Suppose that q > 1
2
qu, whereas he chooses the social surplus maximizing policy if ̃
> 0. and let Then a benevolent incumbent )
qu <
q ̃ under-invests if
q
1−q < . 1−q
1 + U ΔH
Proof. Under-investment is optimal if and only if
µ 1 q u Ib
∗ L u Ip
∗ 1 q u Ip H u Ib L q u Iu H u Ib b ( − ){ [ ( )]− [ (L)]} > −( − ){ [ ( )]− [ ( )]− { ( ( )− [ (H)]}
1 q and, if q > 2, this inequality holds provided that qu. 1−q < ̃
Similarly, if q < 1
2, a benevolent incumbent may ﬁnd it optimal to over-invest in enforce-
ment. Given Δ1U over u Io L u Ie L < 0, Δ1 U over u Ip L u Ie H < 0 and e ) = [ ( )] − [ ( )] H ( ) = [ ( )] − [ ( )]
Δ2 over u I∗ H u Ip




)]− [ ( )]
Lemma 4 Suppose that q < 1 U(over) > 0, then the following holds. If 2 −µΔ2 U
1 ΔL and let q ˜o = over ( )
then a benevolent incumbent chooses the sincere policy. On the other hand, if
over ( )
q
1−q ≥ q ˜o
q qo, a 1−q < ˜
benevolent incumbent over-invests in enforcement.
17Proof. For over-investment to be optimal, U over sincere . This holds if and only if ( ) > U( )
µq u Ib
∗ H u Ip
∗ 1 q u Ib
o L u Ib q u Ip L u Ib { [ ( )]− [ (H)]} > −( − ){ [ ( )]− [ (L)]}− { [ ( )]− [ (H)]}
If ˜ qo < q ˜u, we can also immediately establish the following
Lemma 5 Suppose that q ˜o <
q qu. Then under-investment will be chosen if q > 1 2, whereas 1−q < ˜
the sincere policy will be chosen if q 1 2. ≤ /
/
Lemma 5 tells us that - whenever qo <
q qu - we will (at least with some probability) observe ̃ 1−q < ̃
ineﬃciently high illegal immigration. Hence, in the remainder of the paper we will assume that
lemma 6 holds and analyze which factors can explain diﬀerent patterns of illegal immigration.
5.1 Illegal immigration, information and welfare
Using lemmata (3)-(5), we can fully characterize the political equilibrium. Remember that in the
second period the equilibrium policy choice is trivial, since there are no elections and the politician
knows the supply of foreign workers. Thus, he chooses the policy that maximizes his second period
utility. In the ﬁrst period, on the other hand, re-election concerns shape his policy choice. Since
a populist incumbent always chooses his most preferred policy and is re-elected, we focus on the
more interesting case where the incumbent is benevolent:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the incumbent is benevolent and that lemma 5 holds. Then, if q > 1
2,
there exists a pooling equilibrium with under-investment whereby, if the state of the world is low,
H ( )
migrants are admitted and the incumbent is voted out of oﬃce. On the other hand,
the benevolent incumbent admits I migrants and is re-elected, whereas if the state of the world p
H ( )




are admitted if it is high, and the incumbent is never re-elected.
if q < 1
2 migrants are admitted if the state of
H ( )
Proof. The proposition follows from lemmata (3)-(5).
the world is low, Ib
The ﬁrst part of the proposition establishes an ineﬃciency result. A benevolent incumbent,
who wants to admit more migrants than the median voter, chooses a level of illegal immigration
which is ineﬃciently high because, to achieve his goal without incurring in an electoral punishment,
he strategically under-invests in enforcement letting more foreign workers enter in a concealed way.
Moreover, the median voter may end up re-electing a benevolent incumbent because, given the
available information, he may not be able to distinguish whether the observed number of migrants
has been chosen by a populist politician in the high state of the world or by a benevolent one in
the low state.
18Besides the probability of each state of the world, other factors also play an important role in
determining the likelihood of an equilibrium with under-investment. In particular, from lemma 4
we know that a benevolent incumbent under-invests in enforcement whenever
q qu. This allows 1−q < ̃
us to establish some interesting comparative statics results. We start by analyzing the eﬀect of
changes in the distribution of capital ownership. To do so, let us deﬁne ˜ λp as the median voter’s
ownership share such that the migration levels preferred by a populist and a benevolent under the
two states of the world can be ranked as follows:
Ip
∗ L L Ip
∗ H H (8) ( ) < Ib
∗( ) = ( ) < Ib
∗( )
This implies that for every λp > ˜ λp the ranking of most preferred migration levels for the two types
of politicians is Ip
∗ L I∗ L Ip
∗ H I∗ H . On the other hand, for λp < ˜
p the ranking is λ
( ) < Ip















< ( ) < b ( )
Ip
∗ L H L H . We can then show the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that lemma 3 holds. Then if λp > ˜ λp an equilibrium with under-investment
is more likely to arise, the lower is the share of capital λp owned by the median voter. If instead












µΔ2U qu ̃ = −
Note that Δ1
under U Proof. Under-investment is more likely to arise the larger is and 1 ΔHU
Ip [ (
p, then the utility loss from the policy distortion increases with λ
qu ̃ / ( )] −
p, i.e.
λ > ˜ < 0. it is easy to show that if λ then ∂ ∂λ U = u p, p p L







∂ under ( )/
λp, then ∂Δ2U p < ˜
(
p < 0, and
under))/∂λ
under > 0 and ∂λp
(
( Δ1
H p < 0. At the same time, ∂Δ2U p < 0, whereas ∂
/
∂λ U p =
) 1 ∂ΔL qu ̃ / p < 0. On the other hand, if λ 0. Hence, ∂ ∂λ ∂λ
∂q ˜u so 0. ∂λp ⋛
λ p > ˜ The immediate consequence of proposition 2 is that, if λ p, then ineﬃciently high illegal
immigration is more likely to take place when the distribution of wealth is more unequal. The
reason for this result is two-fold. On the one hand, more heterogeneity implies larger gains from
strategic under-investment: the further away the incumbent is from the median-type in terms of
policy preferences, the more he is willing to engage in strategic under-investment to win elections
and choose his most preferred policy in the second period. On the other hand, if λp decreases,
the ﬁrst period utility loss from under-investment under the low state of the world also decreases,
because Ip H becomes closer to Ib L . Hence, by decreasing the loss from the policy distortion ( ) ( )
and increasing the gain from winning elections, a more unequal capital distribution raises the
chances of strategic under-investment and ineﬃciently high illegal immigration taking place. On
the other hand, if λp < ˜ λp, then the second period utility gain and the ﬁrst period utility loss both
decline, and therefore the result of a change in inequality becomes ambiguous.
The size of the electoral gain from under-investment is also aﬀected by the probability dis-
tribution of the two types of incumbent. When a benevolent incumbent knows that, by loosing
19elections, he will be replaced by an opponent, who is not very likely to be a populist, he will have
less incentives to “pool” by under-investing, and viceversa. Formally:
Proposition 3 Suppose that lemma 3 holds. An equilibrium with under-investment is more likely
to arise the larger the ex-ante probability µ that the incumbent is a populist.
Proof. Since underinvestment arises when
q qu, then under-investment is more likely the 1−q < ̃
larger is qu, therefore the result trivially follows from the fact that ∂ΔU2 ∂µ > 0. ̃ /
6 Border vs domestic enforcement
Having analyzed the main forces inducing a benevolent politician to adopt a strategic behavior
when one enforcement technology is available, we are now ready to extend our baseline model to
allow the politician to choose between two diﬀerent technologies. In particular, we are interested in
analyzing whether an enforcement technology which is less eﬀective might be chosen in equilibrium.
To ﬁx our ideas, the ﬁrst technology – which we call domestic enforcement – can be thought of
as coinciding with the type of enforcement activity we have analyzed so far. The second one
available is instead less eﬀective, in the sense that to enforce a given migration target, it requires
more resources under both states of the world. Since, in the policy debate, the control of migration
ﬂows carried out at the border is often referred to as a less eﬀective tool as compared for example to
work-site inspections (Hanson 2006), we will call border enforcement the less eﬀective technology.
Naturally, our analysis applies to any other form of ineﬃcient use of resources.
ˆ ˆ Formally, let ηB I I and ηD I I respectively denote the border (B) and domestic (D) ( − ) ( − )
enforcement technology, and let
ηB I ˆ I > ηD I ˆ I I I,I (9) ( − ) ( − )∀ˆ∈ { }
To simplify our analysis, we make one additional assumption, i.e. that ηB I I ηD I I . In ( − ) = ( − )
other words, enforcing a given migration target in the low state of the world using the border
enforcement technology is as costly as enforcing the same target using the domestic enforcement
technology if the state of the world is high. Graphically, the two instruments available can be
represented as in ﬁgure 3. Moving from the left to the right, the ﬁrst curve (ηD I ) represents the
cost of domestic enforcement under the low state of the world. The second curve (ηD I ηB I )
( )
( ) = ( )
represents both the cost of domestic enforcement if the state of the world is high, and the cost
of border enforcement if the state is low. The last curve (ηB I ) displays instead the border ( )
enforcement cost under the high state of the world.
As in our previous discussion, at the beginning of the game, neither the politician nor the
public observe the supply of immigrants I ˆ s , but they know its distribution. At the end of the ( )
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Figure 3: Illegal immigration with domestic and border enforcement
21ﬁrst mandate, voters observe the number of immigrants in the country, but neither the amount
of resources spent on enforcement nor how the resources have been employed (i.e. on the more or
less eﬀective technology). As a consequence, the government can now strategically set not only
the budget allocated to enforcement, but also the way resources are employed. In particular, a
benevolent government can admit the same number of migrants allowed by a populist when the
state of the world is high, in two alternative ways. First, as before, it can strategically under-
invest, spending ηU and obtaining a migration level Iu L Ip H and Iu H respectively if the b ( ) = ( ) b ( )
state of the world is low and high (see ﬁgure 3). Alternatively, the benevolent politician can spend
the amount of resources that would maximize the median voter’s welfare (Ep η > ηU), but employ ( )
them “ineﬀectively” by adopting border instead of domestic enforcement. In this case, if the state
of the world is low the number of migrants admitted would be the same chosen by a populist
under the high state (Ip H ), implying that the benevolent politician might have a chance to be ( )
re-elected. On the other hand, if the state is high, the resulting number of migrants would be
IB H (see ﬁgure 3). b ( )
Given the new strategy space, we need again to describe how the median voter updates his
beliefs. Let λD and λB denote the probability that a benevolent incumbent generates the outcome
I by choosing domestic (D) and border (B) enforcement respectively. As before, λL denotes the
probability that a benevolent incumbent generates an outcome I when the state of the world is
low, and λH the probability that he generates the same outcome if the state is high. Then if
voters observe the outcome Ip H , the ex-post probability that the incumbent is a populist can ( )
be computed as follows:
µq
P p Ip H [g = � ( )] =








− )( − )
where µq is the probability that Ip H is generated by a populist, q 1 µ λH is the probability
that it is generated by a benevolent politician mimicking the populist, and 1 q 1 µ λL is the
probability that it is generated by a benevolent politician, either by under-investing in enforcement
or by choosing the ineﬀective enforcement technology.
As before, mimicking cannot be optimal since it does not generate any positive updating in
beliefs. On the other hand, whenever q > 1 2, the adoption of under-investment with domestic /
enforcement or border enforcement generate the same positive update of beliefs. The next propo-
sition characterizes the optimal choice of a benevolent politician if q > 1 2 and both domestic
and border enforcement are available. Let uj I s u ˜ I s ηj I s I , with j = B,D, where [ ( )] = [ ( )]− [ ( )− ]
/
u ˜ I s π E w E c I , is the component of the benevolent politician’s utility function, [ ( )] = ( ) + ( ) − ( )
which does not depend on the enforcement expenditure. Following the notation we have intro-
duced in section 5, let Δ1 U border u Ib
B H u Ib H < 0 be the ﬁrst period utility loss H ( ) = [ ( )] − [ ( )]
22from choosing border enforcement over the sincere policy when the state of the world is high,
and Δ1U border u Ip H u Ib L L (
[
) = [ ( )] − [ ( )]
border I∗ L)]−u[I∗(L)] > 0 denotes instead the second period utility gain from being
U(
2 1 + Δ U Δ µ L
< 0 be the ﬁrst period utility loss when the state is low.
Δ2U u = b p (
in power when the state of the world is low. Finally, let us deﬁne ˜
) (
border ( )
border − 1 ΔH





Proposition 4 Let q > 1 2 and qu. Then, if ˜ u IB H u Ib
u(H < 0, the benevolent b / 1−q < ˜ [ ( )] − [ )]
politician chooses domestic enforcement with underinvestment. If ˜ IB H u ( )]− [ b (




the benevolent politician chooses border enforcement if and only if q >
)]
H)]
> 0, then Iu ˜ H u b
η ( )
u )]−˜ On the [
qu, the benevolent politician chooses border enforcement if ˜
( [ ( . ˜ u I H I
q
1−q > qu <
q
1−q < other hand, whenever ˜ q ˜B,
whereas he implements the sincere policy if q ˜u < q ˜B <
q . 1−q
−η > >
U 0, inequality 10 is satisﬁed if and only if q u
b
Proof. Note that if
q qu, from Lemma 3 we know that underinvestment with domestic 1−q < ˜
enforcement is preferred to the sincere policy. Hence, border enforcement is chosen over domestic
enforcement if the resulting expected payoﬀ is larger. This is true if and only if
˜ q u IB H u Ib
u Ep η ηU (10) ˜ b { [ ( )]− [ (H)]} ≥ ( )−






˜ u u p b
η ( )
u )]−˜ ˜ H u Iu − [ b ( )]
Lemma 3 tells us also that if 1−q >
[
Ep ﬁed, whereas if ˜ u . H ( )]
qu, the sincere policy is preferred to domestic enforcement.
[ ( [ B
b ˜ u I H
̃
q





Hence, border enforcement is chosen over the sincere policy if the resulting payoﬀ is larger, i.e. iﬀ
HU border 1 q Δ1 µ 1 q Δ2U border qΔ1
LU border (11) ( − ) ( ) > − ( )−( − ) ( )
and this is true if and only if ˜ 1−q < q ˜B. qu <
q
q The intuition for the result is as follows. The ﬁrst part of proposition 4 (i.e. when 1−q < q ˜u)
highlights the conditions under which border enforcement is preferred to domestic enforcement
with underinvestment. When the state of the world is low, domestic enforcement generates the
same number of migrants as border enforcement, using less resources to carry out the enforce-
ment activities, and for this reason it is preferred by the benevolent politician. On the other
hand, when the state of the world is high, there is a potential gain from using the less eﬃcient
technology (border) which arises because, by spending more resources to carry out enforcement
activities, the number of migrants allowed under the high state of the world may be closer to
the benevolent politician’s ideal number. When this happens, the utility gain from the policy net
˜ ˜ of the enforcement cost is positive (i.e. u IB H u Iu H > 0), thus implying that the less b [ ( )] − [ b ( )]
eﬃcient enforcement technology can be preferred. In this case, if the high state of the world is
I I H
η ( )
u )]−˜ suﬃciently likely (i.e. q > ˜ u ), the benevolent legislator prefers border to domestic [ ( [ H ( )]
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Ienforcement. This is more likely to happen the larger is the utility gain (net of the enforcement
cost) as compared to the diﬀerence in enforcement costs Ep η ηU. ( )−
q The second part of the proposition (i.e. when 1−q > q ˜u) shows that, even if the sincere policy
is preferred to domestic enforcement, border enforcement might still be chosen in equilibrium. In
other words, allowing for an additional instrument besides underinvestment, enables the benevolent
politician to sustain a pooling equilibrium in which he can generate “excessive” illegal immigration
that could have not been sustained if only underinvestment was available.
In our analysis so far, voters are uninformed both on the amount of resources spent and on the
eﬀectiveness of the enforcement technology. After September 11, migration policy in the US has
come under increased scrutiny, and much attention has been put on the activities of the newly
established Department of Homeland Security, which has seen its budget substantially increase.
As this has been widely discussed in the press and the other media, one could think that the public
has become better informed concerning the resources invested in migration policy enforcement. In
terms of our model, this implies that the electorate might have gained access to information on
the size of the enforcement budget. How does this change our results? First note that, when the
enforcement budget is known, the under-investment strategy allows the public to perfectly infer
the politician’s type. As a consequence, an equilibrium with domestic enforcement and under-
investment cannot arise. On the other hand, ineﬃciently high illegal immigration can still occur
as a result of an ineﬀective use of the resources spent on enforcement. In particular, we can show
that the following holds:
Lemma 6 Suppose that the median voter observes the amount of resources spent on enforcement.
q Then the benevolent politician chooses border enforcement if 1−q < q ˜B, whereas he chooses the
q sincere policy if 1−q > q ˜B.
Proof. Since the sincere strategy is always preferred to domestic enforcement, then border en-
forcement is chosen if and only if it delivers an higher payoﬀ than the sincere strategy and this is
q true if and only if if 1−q < q ˜B.
Note that, when more information becomes available to the public, domestic enforcement with
under-investment cannot be used any longer by the benevolent politician to “pool” with a populist
one. As a result, the benevolent politician will resort more often to the adoption of the sincere
policy to admit the constrained social optimal number of migrants.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a model in which illegal immigration arises endogenously as the
result of a binding oﬃcial immigration quota and lax enforcement. We have shown that electoral
24concerns play a crucial role in explaining “excessively high” illegal immigration, resulting from the
use of suboptimal policies. Motivated by the recent US experience, we have considered two sources
of policy ineﬃciency. On the one hand, the government might strategically underfund migration
control operations; on the other, it might respond to public pressure for adequate funding, but
strategically use the resources in an ineﬀective way. We have shown that, as long as the government
has an information advantage over the public concerning the way it controls migration ﬂows,
it might ﬁnd it optimal to announce a target pleasing a majority of the electorate, but then
strategically relax its enforcement, by either underinvesting or using resources ineﬀectively. Thus,
our paper is able to explain both the prevailing political rhetoric of “closed” borders, and the large
number of illegal immigrants brought about by a lax policy enforcement.
We can think of at least two lines along which our analysis could be extended. First, in our
model undocumented immigrants do not diﬀer in any way from legal foreign workers. In particular,
we have not analyzed the working of a dual labor market, which is important to understand the
economics of illegal immigration. Furthermore, we have also abstracted away from considering
the interactions between immigrants and the destination country’s welfare state system, which
may play an important role in shaping policy preferences (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007,
Facchini and Mayda 2009). An analysis of a richer model which considers both these aspects is
left for future research.
Second, the process through which immigration policy enforcement is captured in our paper
is rather simple, i.e. it boils down to an enforcement cost function. In reality, the implementa-
tion of the legislated immigration policy in the United States involves the interaction of multiple
government agencies both at the federal and the local level. An analysis of the micro–level inter-
actions between the various entities taking part in the enforcement process might provide further
important insights to understand some of the immigration policy puzzles we observe.
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